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Harmonization: 
A Uniform Standard 
Rebecca Korzec 
Uni'Versity of Baltimore 
The purpose of products liability laws is 
to create safer products. In our global economy, 
a uniform approach to products liability law is 
the most effective means of fulfilling this pur-
pose. American manufacturers market their 
products nationally and internationally. World-
wide, consumers buy products marketed 
through all means of interstate and international 
commerce, including the Internet. For this rea-
son, any single product may be regulated by a 
variety of different state or international prod-
ucts liability laws. The application of these in-
consistent rules may discourage essential manu-
facturer decision-making, may have a discrimi-
natory impact upon some product manufactur-
ers and users, and may lead to externalization of 
accident costs. 
Among industrialized nations, the United 
States is unique in addressing tort law at the 
state rather than the national level. For exam-
ple, Australia and Canada, which share a com-
mon-law heritage with the United States, have 
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federal tort systems. The United States ap-
proach may be appropriate in some tort settings, 
such as in the premises liability or motor vehi-
cle accident context (not involving a claim of 
products liability), where the state rule's impact 
remains within that state's geographical bounda-
ries. Unlike the simple "fender-bender", which 
occurs within the borders of one state, the typi-
cal product is manufactured and marketed na-
tionally or internationally. Therefore, several 
factors suggest that uniform federal treatment of 
product liability laws may be a more desirable 
means of regulation. 
First, conflicting state rules create an ab-
sence of predictable standards for manufactur-
ers. For example, while some states may employ 
the consumer expectations test for determining 
product defects, others may apply the risk util-
ity test. To be efficient, manufacturers must 
mass-produce and market their products na-
tionally. However, they may find it cumber-
some, if not impossible, to comply with the con-
flicting rules of the various states in which the 
product is made or marketed. Manufacturers 
cannot always redesign their products to meet 
competing, inconsistent state requirements. 
Thus, conflicting rules not only discourage es-
sential manufacturer planning and decision-
making, they also jeopardize product design and 
safety. In sum, experimentation by the states in 
creating their own doctrines and regulations, 
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one of the supposed benefits of decentralization, 
actually may become a detriment. 
Second, state lawmakers may legislate an 
inherent bias into products liability law, adopt-
ing rules that advance parochial interests, which 
favor resident product injury victims over na-
tional manufacturers. l Conversely, a state may 
manipulate its product liability rules to advance 
its political or economic development goals, 
thereby creating a pro-manufacturer bias. This 
can be explained, at least in part, by some basic 
realities of the legislative process. Business or 
insurance interests, who possess substantial 
funds to underwrite intensive lobbying cam-
paigns, may influence state legislators to create 
a more hospitable environment for out- of- state 
manufacturers. By contrast, product consumers 
not only underestimate product risks2 , they also 
may underestimate the potential benefits of or-
ganized legislative advocacy. J As a result, prod-
uct users may overlook these activities, giving 
little reward to legislators who adopt a pro-
1 See, e.g. Blankenship 'D. Gen. Motors Corp., 406 S.E. 2d 781 
(W.Va. 1991), in which the Supreme Court of West Virginia 
stated that, where a split of authority exists about which crash-
worthiness rule to apply, the court should choose the rule more 
favorable to the plaintiff. 
2 See, e.g. Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, "Taking Behavior-
alism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation," 112 
Harv. L. Rev. 1420 (1999). See also, Gary T. Schwartz, "Consid-
ering the Proper Federal Role in American Tort Law," 38 Ariz. L. 
Rev. 917,936 (1996). 
J [d., Schwartz at 937. 
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consumer stance.4 Thus, it is not surprising that 
most legislative tort reform favors insurance 
companies and sellers.S The federal government 
can play an important neutralizing role in pre-
venting such manipulation by states. 
Third, because most products are manu-
factured and marketed nationally and interna-
tionally, the market for many products is suffi-
ciently global to justify federal and international 
regulation. Congress already has recognized the 
advantages of uniform federal treatment of 
products liability issues. Nationally, the Food 
and Drug Administration, the Consumer Product 
Safety Commission and the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration are current exam-
ples of this federal approach. 
There may be disadvantages inherent in 
the imposition of uniform federal products li-
ability laws. State lawmaking is viewed as ad-
vancing autonomy, self-reliance, individualism, 
and independence. To the extent that states are 
prevented from controlling products liability 
laws, these goals may not be realized. Moreover, 
uniform national standards may ignore local 
voter concerns. Similarly, innovation, economic 
development, political representation, and voter 
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interests may be burdened by national stan-
dards that seem difficult to implement. 
Can the obstacles created by non-uniformity 
be removed through the application of choice-
of-law rules? A number of proposals have been 
advanced, including: 1) applying the state law 
where the manufacturer has the greatest num-
ber of employees; 2) applying the state law 
where the product is first sold; 3) permitting 
manufacturers to designate the applicable state 
law. 6 
Having seen the existence of non-
uniformity and state law bias in American prod-
ucts liability law, it is important to consider 
these in the global context. The arguments in 
favor of federalization of products liability apply 
to globalization, as well. How might interna-
tionallaw respond effectively to these concerns? 
First, a comprehensive code or treaty might in-
ternationalize all aspects of global products li-
ability law. One immediate problem with this 
approach is whether products liability policy 
concerns would be addressed adequately, or 
whether they would be subjected to parochial 
political decisions. Unfortunately, politicization 
could jeopardize product safety if individual re-
gimes conSCiously or inadvertently create disin-
6 Schwartz, supra note 2 at 937. 
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centives to safety and health measures by adopt-
ing rules that favor sellers. 
Tobacco, as a product, offers a compelling 
argument for global regulation. The World 
Health Organization estimates that about 5 mil-
lion people a year die from tobacco-related dis-
ease, including about 400,000 a year in the 
United States alone. This annual global death 
count is projected to be more than 8 million by 
2020 and 10 million by 2030. 7 Seventy percent 
of these deaths will occur in developing coun-
tries. S As industrialized nations combat the to-
bacco industry, these international companies 
focus their marketing efforts on developing na-
tions. 
Should the international tobacco problem 
be controlled by international treaty? In 1999, 
the World Health Assembly (WHA) , the govern-
ing body of the World Health Organization, 
agreed to have the WHO create a tobacco con-
trol treaty. The World Health Assembly adopted 
the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
(FCTC) on May 23, 2003. The FCTC, a legally 
binding treaty, is the first international public 
health treaty. It encourages countries to recog-
7 Framework Convention Alliance-The Framework Convention 
on Tobacco Control-FAQ; available at 
http://www.fctc.org/about FCTClindex.shtml 
S [d. 
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nize and combat the global hazards presented 
by tobacco-related disease. 9 
The WHO justifies the need for an inter-
national treaty in several ways. First," [t]he to-
bacco epidemic is an international problem."10 
Second, "[t]he tobacco industry is a global in-
dustry" .II Third, "[ t] obacco industry marketing 
campaigns executed across a number of differ-
ent countries simultaneously, including through 
satellite television; .... " require global solutionsY 
The ultimate question is what might such 
a treaty accomplish? What might collective ac-
tion by the world's nations accomplish that the 
nations cannot achieve by their own initiatives? 
The treaty addresses measures that require in-
ternational cooperation, such as regulating in-
ternational advertising and combating interna-
tional smuggling. These problems should re-
ceive priority in an international treaty because 
they require collective action and resources. 
Individual countries would receive benefits that 
they could not achieve on their own. 
Moreover, a treaty focused on truly inter-
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for two reasons. First, individual countries may 
actually appreciate the benefits they will derive 
from these cooperative efforts. Second, the re-
quirements imposed upon each individual coun-
try may not be burdensome. Nevertheless, coun-
tries with strong national tobacco control re-
gimes may reject an international treaty that 
addresses substantive domestic policy. These 
nations with existing domestic controls may 
view their regimes as more effective than they 
might be under an international agreement. 
Moreover, they may fear that limited interna-
tional controls could undercut strong domestic 
rules already in place. 13 
The framework international treaty may 
be viewed as a significant world health measure, 
encouraging nations to act collectively against 
global tobacco companies. Ultimately, tobacco 
control requires changing the attitudes of 
masses of people to make smoking unaccept-
able. Without an international approach to the 
global tobacco industry, such changes are 
unlikely to occur. The treaty is a timely and in-
structive example of global product regulation 
by a uniform standard. 
13 Derek Yach and Douglas Bettcher, "Globalisation of to-
bacco industry influence and new global responses." Tobacco 
Control 2000; 9:206-216. 
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In sum, a uniform approach to products 
liability laws is the most effective means of cre-
ating safer products. Uniformity diminishes the 
ability of state lawmakers to advance merely pa-
rochial interests, or to favor business interests 
at the expense of the consumer. Finally, on an 
international level, uniformity advances global 
solutions to global problems. 
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